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Mark Twain and Sigmund Freud on the 
Discontents of Civilization W. R. Irwin 
THE FRAMERS OF T H E American Declaration of Indepen 
dence asserted that human beings have certain inalienable rights?life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. These founding fathers might have 
declared also that "in a stare of nature" only the powerful, predatory 
few can enjoy these rights. For most people life in that mythic state 
would be, as Thomas Hobbes describes it in Leviathan (1650), "solitary, 
poor, nasty, brutish, and short." In a word, uncivilized. Our forefathers 
might have noted further that the only releases from this dismal 
condition are two fortunate developments of mythic history: the form 
ing of a social contract and the growth of civilization. They might 
finally have declared what experience teaches us, that the price of our 
happy civilized state is the curtailment of personal freedom. 
We easily evade these simple, self-evident, bitter truths, for our 
candor is a feeble security against self-deception. We must rather rely 
on people whose gift to us is the steady reminder that the price of 
pleasure is pain. Such benefactors were Mark Twain and Sigmund 
Freud. 
I propose to show that, in their different ways, Mark Twain and Freud 
gave concentrated attention to the conflict between personal freedom 
and culture. Neither could perceive any happy resolution. The best that 
any person can achieve is compromise and endurance.1 Even those who 
try to reject society by seeking solitude and detachment?those who 
"light out for the territory"? have before them no congenial prospect. 
Now there is nothing original in the conclusions I have been sketch 
ing. Students of culture, even those who reject license and exalt liberty 
within the law, who claim that the benefits of civilization are worth the 
cost, or who hold social order to be a manifestation of divine will, have 
never been able to deny that civilization generates discontents. That the 
discontents can be scorned as unworthy, overcome by piety, argued into 
quietude by self-deception does not make them less real. Civilization 
requires an internalized control of the aggressiveness which is, 
as Freud 
Freud seems to hold out a hope that in some vague future the harshness of the cultural superego will be 
mollified by some kind of therapeutic control. How this may affect individual happiness he does not suggest. 
(Civilization and its Discontents), translated . . . and edited by James Strachey (New York: Norton, 1962, p. 91.) 
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notes, "the constitutional inclination of human beings . . . towards one 
another." 
I need not continue stating the obvious. Rather I turn to the ways, 
remarkably similar, in which two persons, remarkably dissimilar, saw 
the problems and dealt with them. Most of you have already surmised 
that for this examination I shall concentrate on two books: The Adven 
tures of Huckleberry Finn and Civilization and its Discontents. 
A useful approach may be through some consideration of Mark 
Twain and Sigmund Freud themselves. At first sight it may seem that 
the two had little in common. Mark Twain, born and reared along the 
Mississippi River before the Civil War, when the civilizing process was 
in an early stage and only the river towns showed signs of what is usually 
thought to be culture. Mark Twain, with little formal education, 
self-made by enterprise, adventure, travel, personally directed reading, 
but never remotely an intellectual in the usual sense of the word. Mark 
Twain, journalist, professional funnyman driven by need and later by 
debt to more performance than he found comfortable, a commentator 
who relied for his validity on acute observation, a curious combination 
of tolerances and prejudices, and his sense that human nature is every 
where and at all times essentially the same, "the damned human race." 
Freud, a Jewish intellectual, heir to an old and highly wrought culture 
scorned by those who did not share it, an urbanit? in that most urbane 
of cities, Vienna, at a time when its urbanity was at a height of 
flourishing decadence, with disaster not far in the future. Sigmund 
Freud, carefully and systematically educated in long-established disci 
plines, which he mastered and from which he then seceded, driven by 
an 
experimental, questioning, speculative mind to clinical determina 
tions and principles of therapy which members of his profession long 
resisted. Sigmund Freud, polymath, citizen of Europe, stimulator of 
disciples and cults as well as of opponents, promoter through no wish 
of his own of myriad popularizations and endless cocktail party conver 
sations, provided as much by those who do not understand his work 
(perhaps have not even read it) as by those who do, arbiter still of our 
assumptions as to personality. 
How could any two men be more different? Yet many of you have 
detected even in the contrasting generalizations I have just proposed, 
ways in which the two minds and dispositions were similar. Both were 
born humbly, to decent stock, but with no privilege of family ascendan 
cy. Both were self-made, struggling through early hardships, never 
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enjoying affluence. Both propounded iconoclastic views. Both found 
little comfort in their inherited religions. Both were devoted family 
men, though Freud's adjustment to this demand of civilization seems to 
have been more comfortable than Mark Twain's. Both were capable of 
great, though unsentimental, compassion with the insulted and the 
injured of their worlds; both scorned pettiness and malice. Both attracted 
admirers, even disciples, and in their different ways left impressions on 
cultures beyond those of their immediate spheres of action, impressions 
which are visible today. If the personages of history have some power 
to make us what we are, we owe part of our present being to Mark 
Twain and Sigmund Freud. 
Let us come a little closer and examine more specific evidence of 
rapport between them. It is a matter of record that Freud was well 
acquainted with the works of Mark Twain. He attended one of the 
"public readings," in Vienna in February 1898. Freud mentions this 
event in a letter to his friend Dr. Wilhelm Fliess: "I treated myself to 
listening to our old friend Mark Twain in person, which was a great 
pleasure.'2 Years later he cites the same experience in a footnote to a 
passage in Civilization and its Discontents. Predictably enough, Freud 
countered 
repeated assertions that the psychoanalytic movement is dead 
by quoting Mark Twain's famous telegram: "Report of my death 
greatly exaggerated." In response to an inquiry from the Viennese 
publisher Hugo Heller, Freud names Mark Twain's Sketches among ten 
"good" books: books "to which one stands in rather the same relation 
ship as to 'good' friends, to whom one owes a part of one's knowledge 
of life and view of the world?books which one has enjoyed and gladly 
commends to others, but in connection with which the element of timid 
reverence, the feeling of one's own smallness in the face of their 
greatness, is not particulary prominent."3 Along with Mark Twain's 
Sketches, Freud mentions other books. Among them are Kipling 's Jungle 
Book, the Essays of Thomas Babington Macaulay, and Merezh-Kovsky's 
Leonardo da Vinci. It is altogether a strange list, which, in accordance with 
the spirit of the request, has "come to my mind without a great deal 
of reflection." But the list does show again the catholicity of Freud's 
tastes in 
reading, for it becomes evident, in the brief essay which he 
2See The Origins of Psychoanalysis: Letters to Wilhelm Fliess, Drafts and Notes: 1887-1902 (New York: Basic Books, 
1954), p. 245. Ernest Jones dates the lecture as September 2, 1898, a mistaken reading perhaps of 9. 2. 98. 
See The Life and Works of Sigmund Freud, 3 vols., (New York: Basic Books, 1957), 1, 329. 
3Jones, 3, 422. 
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wrote to accompany his reply, that he knew the "great books," the 
"significant books," and his own "favorite books" as well. Indeed, one 
wonders again why Freud did not choose literature, rather than medi 
cine, as the major emphasis in his versatile career. 
In Jokes and the Unconscious Freud cites several stories by Mark Twain, 
all of which in some way illustrate the reliance of humor on "economy 
of pity." That these stories concerning his family or his brother, are 
transfers or fabrications only heightens the comic effect. For example, 
"... Mark Twain presents us his pedigree, which he traces back almost 
as far as one of the companions of Columbus. . . . The mechanism of 
humoristic pleasure is not disturbed by our knowing that this family 
history is a fictitious one, and that this fiction serves a satirical tendency 
to expose the embellishments which result in imparting such pedigrees 
to others; it is just as independent of the conditions of reality as the 
manufactured comic."4 Of course, Freud's comments on Mark Twain's 
humor illustrate all over again that casual analysis of comic effects are 
usually as dreary as the comic itself is lively. But they show also an 
abiding respect for Mark Twain's work. 
Of course, no one should be surprised at Freud's allusions to Mark 
Twain, in contexts both personal and professional. The Vienna master 
is famous for his range, for finding clinical clues in non-clinical sources. 
Even so, his attention to Mark Twain, in the citations above and in other 
passing allusions which I need not mention, suggests more than a casual 
acquaintance and regard. 
When we look, however, in the works of Mark Twain and in his 
copious autobiographical writings for references to Freud, there is only 
silence. It is no good to say that Mark Twain must have read Freud 
because of the ease with which purposeful people can discern Freudian 
hints in his fiction or because in a series of stories written after his 
daughter Susy died Mark Twain exploited dream motifs. The interpreta 
tion of dreams for purposes of diagnosis and therapy was scarcely within 
his 
capability. Actually, circumstances alone would make it unlikely 
that Freud could have come more than by accident to Mark Twain's 
notice. His trips to Europe in the late nineteenth century were scarcely 
culture cruises; he was lecturing for money, exploiting his reputation 
in order to pay his debts. His discovering a revolutionary depth psychol 
4See The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (London: Hogarth Press, 1964), 
8, 230-231. 
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ogy would have been only a remote possibility. Even if he had discov 
ered it, and?even more amazing?understood it in its unpopularized, 
untranslated form, he would surely have felt prudentially obligated to 
stay clear of any such scandalous speculations, however congenial he 
might secretly have found them. 
Mark Twain died in 1910. Freud's one visit to America occurred in 
1909, when he delivered five lectures at Clark University and received 
an honorary doctorate, the only such award of his lifetime. Freudianism 
for non-professionals reached America later, indeed, not before 1915, and 
it became a matter for sophisticated conversation in the 1920's.5 Even 
had he been disposed to such a subject, Mark Twain had virtually no 
chance to become acquainted with it. 
So, despite the repeated allusions to Mark Twain in Freud's work, the 
engaging prospect of exchange between the two who were great in 
disparate ways was never a real possibility. Whatever else, this essay 
cannot be a study of influence or reciprocal profit. Even so, a substantive 
congruity of the two men's views on civilization and its discontents is 
discernible, and to this I now turn. 
I shall lead with a brief discussion of Civilization and its Discontents. 
Early in Chapter 3 Freud states the problem, mentions a solution which, 
though appealing, is patently unworkable, and shows that the human 
dilemma imposed by civilization is such that no prompt solution can 
be 
expected. A remarkable 
achievement for these two sentences: 
This contention holds that what we call our civilization is 
largely responsible for our misery, and that we should be 
much happier if we gave it up and returned to primitive 
conditions. I call this contention astonishing because, in 
whatever way we may define the concept of civilization, it 
is a certain fact that all the things with which we seek to 
protect ourselves against the threats that emanate from the 
sources of suffering are part ofthat very civilization, (p. 33) 
From this the conclusion he reaches may be expected: "My intention 
has been to represent the sense of guilt as the most important problem 
5On the spread of Freudianism in America see Frederick J. Hoffman, Freudianism and the Literary Mind (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1957), pp. 44-58. Rose Macaulay's novel Dangerous Ages (New 
York: Boni and Liveright, 1921) shows psychoanalysis of Freudian orientation already well established in 
England and high-level popular accounts of Freudian theory already fashionable reading among the bright 
young people. 
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in the development of civilization and to show that the price we pay 
for our advance of civilization is a loss of happiness through the 
heightening of the sense of guilt" (p. 81). Actually throughout the short 
book Freud deals with other matters of importance, but all are related 
to the conclusion he presents. He does not wish to "express an opinion 
upon the value of human civilization" (p. 91). His conscience and his 
professional habits force him to limit his considerations to a description 
which he derives from a speculative history of the psyche during the 
time it is learning conformity with the demands of civilization. 
Repeatedly he states that all his revelations are no more than common 
knowledge, and I doubt that this is a pose of ironical modesty. After we 
have read the book it does seem to state what is common knowledge, 
though few of us could write anything like it. 
Let me attempt to trace the history of the psyche as it learns and forces 
itself to meet the demands of civilization. Freud seems implicitly to 
agree with those political mythographers who posit that some time in 
the far past, the majority of persons living in a "state of nature" found 
themselves needing protection from the predatory power of the few. So, 
by a concerted act, they created the "social contract," and with their 
unified strength forced the powerful few to accept it. One dare not be 
more 
specific here, for one is dealing with an aetiological myth which 
has even less narrative substance than most myths of national heritage. 
Several consequences of the contract came along in time. It took human 
advantage ofy though it did not directly achieve, the taming of fire, the 
use of tools, the development of technology, accomplishments fostering 
the institutions which organize religious experience, education, domes 
tic living, the arts. These institutions are the agents of social ameliora 
tion, and they secure to man the "beauty, cleanliness, and order" which 
he needs as much as he needs control of the forces and resources of 
nature. 
Even before these phenomena of civilization gained the development 
which we know, any person born into the new dispensation faced 
problems with the demands of civilization and with himself. Even now, 
it is axiomatic that no one is born civilized and that no one becomes 
civilized by such a conversion as that which transformed Saul of Tarsus 
into Saint Paul. The social contract is already there, and each person 
must get through a process, slow, effortful, never completely successful, 
of meeting its demands. There are the sexual drives, which are far from 
simple?not just predatory and aggressive, not just cherishing and 
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nurturing. Eros is prominent, but Pan and Priapus are there as well. 
Clearly it is no good to eliminate the problems deriving from the libido 
simply by unselective, or even selective, castration. Clearly no external 
control will work to minimize the aggressive potential of sexual desire 
while maximizing its power to promote communities of love. Most of 
the institutions which develop have some program to this end, but unless 
people are to lose all freedom and with this all capability of contributing 
to the growth of civilization, institutional control of the id is infeasible. 
What is needed is internal control, in a word, conscience or superego, 
derived from the ego itself, but endowed with a power to inspire fear 
which, internalized, becomes that great monitor, a sense of guilt, a 
phenomenon different, as Freud points out, from 
remorse. All institu 
tions must operate to keep the sense of guilt effective in controlling the 
barely latent aggressivity of each person, because only when this sense 
of guilt is keen can the positive, beneficial, elevating results of cultural 
institutions be achieved. So we have the civilized person?unable to 
escape civilization; surrounded by its benefits and demands; pleased with 
them, perhaps aspiring to advance the good works of culture, but still 
plagued by anti-cultural urges; wishing to be virtuous, but aware that, 
if virtue gives no other reward than its ineffable self, the reward is poor 
indeed. Throughout all these ambivalences, the civilized person remains 
guilt ridden, restive, discontented. What is true of the person is true also 
of the societies, even the "primitive" ones, which seem at sight to have 
none of the problems of civilization. As it is with sex, so with all other 
kinds of energy. Repression is essential, if man is to survive and prosper, 
and guilt, that internal agent of repression, is our best friend. But, 
stubbornly human, we not only love, we also hate our friend. Somewhat 
as I have described Freud's book is in general the way Mark Twain 
would have understood it, had he enjoyed the opportunity to read it.6 
Now we know that, for whatever reason, the works of Mark Twain 
are free of any representation of genital love, heterosexual or homosexu 
Though Mark Twain was innocent of Freudian language, he understood that conscience, which we have 
come to know as a substructure of the superego, dwells on violations of our ideals and promotes feelings 
of guilt. An excellent example is his fantasy entitled "The Facts Concerning the Carnival of Crime in 
Connecticut." In this Mark Twain's own conscience, a "shriveled shabby dwarf" which nonetheless 
resembles him, appears to torment him with his sins of omission and commission. This "caricature o? me 
in little" is censorious, gleeful, malicious, and right. "Every sentence was an accusation, and every accusation 
a truth." And when Mark Twain kills the little monster, he exults: "You behold before you a man whose 
life-conflict is done, whose soul is at peace, a man whose heart is dead to sorrow, dead to suffering, dead 
to remorse; a man without a conscience." Thereafter he launches on a carnival of crime, and his "life 
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al. Much as he may have been amused by the genteel tradition, it had 
him in its grip. But as I suggested earlier, the history of the psyche's 
adjustment which Freud traces in terms of sexuality, because this is 
fundamental, may be traced also to essentially the same uneasy peace in 
the other aspects of the individual's confrontation with the blessings and 
the unwelcome demands of civilization. And with many of these 
non-sexual aspects of civilization and its discontents Mark Twain dealt 
copiously in Huckleberry Finn. Moreover, he sets forth in narrative some 
features of the conflict which Freud, for good reason, only hints at. 
Freud was concerned with the theoretical aspects of a basic and perma 
nent problem. It was not to his purpose in the work we are considering 
to present specific social anatomy and even less to indulge himself in 
value judgments. Mark Twain, however, was concerned with social 
anatomy, and he had the experience on which to base accurate descrip 
tions and narratives. He was indeed interested in value judgments which, 
though they show no vanity of dogmatizing, are nonetheless partisan, 
sometimes favoring and sometimes opposing standard values. Particular 
ly, because he was devoted to his idea of the damned human race, he 
was intent to show how official proponents of civilization can be the 
most flagrant enemies of civilization, even when they are presumably 
acting without animus against it. Mark Twain was also much interested 
in human maturing, how it can be both advanced and impaired by one 
of the great institutions of civilization, education. 
In the paragraphs to come I shall examine first what we learn about 
education in Huckleberry Finn and then what we see of offenses against 
civilization as perpetrated by civilized people themselves. 
From many works other than Huckleberry Finn we know that Mark 
Twain held a plenitude of views about the discontents of civilization and 
those who have made it. But Huckleberry Finn itself is bare of formulary 
and theoretical statements. Even so, from character, events, and dramatic 
presentation we can reliably infer a critique, mostly adverse though 
is all bliss." (See Tom Sawyer Abroad, Tom Sawyer, Detective, and other Stories (New York and London: Harper, 
1924, pp. 302-325). 
In this jeu d'esprit Mark Twain ignores the ego-ideal, that counterpart of conscience, and fails to distinguish 
between remorse and feelings of guilt. Even so, Mark Twain reveals perceptions and convictions remarkably 
consonant with Freud's. 
I am grateful to my colleague Professor Baender for suggesting that the fantasy discussed in this note 
is pertinent to the subject of my paper. 
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comically expressed, of the institutions designed to keep society in order. 
Let us start with the main character himself. In the view of those who 
surround him, except for Jim, Huck Finn is a bright youngster desper 
ately in need of civilization. On the first page we learn that "the Widow 
Douglas she took me for her son, and allowed she could civilize me ..." 
In their different and sometimes strange ways others have the same 
motivation?Miss Watson, Judge Thatcher, Aunt Sally, Tom Sawyer. 
All work by some kind of attempted direct imposition. Huck Finn's own 
attitude is ambivalent. He is grateful, knowing, somewhat like the 
young James Boswell, his own need to lead an orderly life. Huck is 
existentially guilty, susceptible and compliant, respectful of authority, 
yet restive and resistant. To complete the sentence quoted earlier: "But 
it was 
rough living in the house all the time, considering how dismal 
regular and decent the widow was in all her ways; and so when I 
couldn't stand it no longer I lit out." This part of the sentence is, I 
propose, a purposeful forecast of the last two sentences in the book: "But 
I reckon I got to light out for the territory ahead of the rest, because 
Aunt Sally she's going to adopt me and civilize me, and I can't stand 
it. I been there before." Does this envelope of language mean that Huck 
has learned nothing from the educative process of his adventures? 
Scarcely. In fact, he has improved his natural shrewdness and competi 
tiveness to the point of being capable of any kind of worldly success he 
might wish. It does mean, I believe, that Huck Finn has seen the moral 
issues in that unequal contest between personal freedom and conformity 
which Freud describes and has made his choice of values. On the islands, 
on the raft, by himself or in Jim's company, Huck Finn experiences 
moments of blissful freedom. The two of them do indeed form, in 
Lionel Trilling's happy phrase, a community of saints. But these 
moments are 
always succeeded by confrontations with aspects of civili 
zation, elevated or corrupt, which abrogate the simple enjoyment of 
release and make Huck defend his personal values as best he can. In such 
defense he is remarkably skillful. But still his maneuvers are responses 
to social pressure, not actions freely taken, and thus they are compro 
mised. 
There are in the preceding paragraph several threads which I did not 
follow out. I excepted Jim from the company of those who attempt to 
civilize Huck Finn. Yet Jim does more than anyone else to educate him, 
to promote an acceptance of certain aspects of being civilized, aspects 
which are both unorthodox and valid. Jim's secret of effectiveness is one 
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which he himself does not know. He educates, not by imposing pro 
grams derived from institutions, but by submission and love. He can 
reproach, as he does after Huck plays the mean trick of making Jim 
believe that he was only dreaming on the fogbound raft, and thus he 
prompts, not guilt, but what Freud calls remorse. But this reproach, 
coming from disappointed love, is powerfully effective. Probably more 
than anything else, this incident determines Huck's decision at that time 
of moral crisis when he tears up the note to Miss Watson and consents 
to go to hell. Here we see the real force of Jim as unintending teacher: 
his example, not his effort, draws out from Huck the best that worthy 
youngster has in him. There are, of course, passages, mainly comic, in 
which Jim and Huck attempt to instruct each other?Huck as a purvey 
or of enlightenment as to French and history, Jim as expositor of the 
reality and value of superstition. But these have none of the marks of 
imposed civilizing. They do not show a "superior" person bestowing 
benefit on an "inferior." There is no effort on the part of either to secure 
conformity; they are not coercive. Likely Huck does benefit by coming 
to understand superstition, an understanding which no enlightened 
person dare neglect. But again it is an understanding which he freely 
accepts. In short, the efforts to civilize Huck by imposing education on 
him produce little benefit, except to sharpen his native shrewdness and 
make his resistance more effective. From teacher Jim, however, he gains 
something far better than knowledge. He gains a brother, an inestimable 
satisfaction for a boy who has always been lonely, and he gains a mature 
moral sense. 
Huck Finn's other encounters with civilizing forces are less happy 
than his dealings with Jim. What he learns from watching the institu 
tions which civilize and by feeling their pressure on himself is exactly 
what Freud noted, that by repressing personal freedom they generate a 
discontent from which there can be no lasting relief, for the discontent 
is, in effect, the price that civilization exacts from each of us. And Huck 
learns 
something further, a truth implicit in Freud's essay, though Freud 
does not stress it. Grant that there can be no civilization without the 
exertion of a superior power, usually embodied in an institution, on 
persons who must be made and kept obedient. If the obedient submit, 
so that there need be no evident coercion, all seems harmonious; the 
institution and its agents appear benevolent, perhaps actually are. But, 
as Huck Finn sadly observes, there is nothing inherent in a civilizing 
institution to prevent its agents from using it to advance their personal 
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interest by coercing and exploiting the unprotected, much as they did 
in the mythical "state of nature." Now let us see in more detail what 
Huck Finn observes of the workings of civilization. 
Any genuine civilization is a social organism, a complex of many 
elements. The main components of civilization which Huck Finn sees, 
in addition to education, are organized religion, law (chiefly the law of 
property), the differentiation among persons as to social standing, and 
the conventions of inherited romance. He sees both benign and destruc 
tive manifestations of each. He cannot avoid participating in the opera 
tions of each and being affected by each. Huck's participations are 
sometimes admirable, sometimes culpable, though the general tendency 
of his character development is toward maturity and improvement. 
Huck encounters religious people throughout his adventures, and his 
attitude toward them and their professed beliefs is not at all simple. He 
knows they are mainly benevolent towards him, and he knows that he 
needs their beneficence, which, in fact, he gets from most of them. But 
he knows that every one of these pious people derives from religious 
belief a conviction opposed to freeing a slave, understood as a piece of 
property the possession of which is protected by law. Huck Finn shares 
this conviction with such intensity that when he violates it, he assumes 
that he has chosen damnation. But his love for a new-found brother 
makes him willing to accept the eternal punishment. As Freud tells us, 
love is the most forceful civilizing emotion, though he might have 
added that attempts to institutionalize love make up a generally sorry 
history. 
We all know that established majority religions and secular law are 
for worldly purposes normally in accord. Both yield rules for daily 
conduct. Embarrassment and worse arise when a religiously founded 
counter code, derived from such unworldly values as love and justice, 
comes into conflict with a 
religiously founded code for prudent and 
advantageous daily conduct. So Huck Finn is far worse than embarrassed 
to 
obey the inner prompting which tells him that his black brother Jim 
has an inherent right to be free. What Huck chooses is the kind of action 
which, generally practiced, might give us that yet unknown phenome 
non, the good society, good according to the ethical code of any of the 
world's major religious faiths. Without having read the preface to 
Androcles and the Lion, Huck knew the truth of Shaw's pronouncement: 
This man Jesus has not been a failure yet; for nobody has been 
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sane 
enough to try his way. 
. . . We have always had a curious 
feeling that, though we crucified Christ on a stick, he some 
how managed to get hold of the right end of it, and that if 
we were better men we might try his plan 
. . . 
7 
Somewhat naively we assume that the more civilized people are, the 
higher will be their social position, their standards of conduct, and their 
prosperity. Huck Finn has grown up accepting all this as axiomatic and 
believes as a consequence that his own low status is a result of his 
unworthiness, for which he feels guilty. Exactly as Freud suggested, 
Huck Finn's guilt is his internalized response to social pressures. He 
longs to resemble his "betters"?the Widow Douglas, Tom Sawyer, 
Judge Thatcher, and others?though he understands too that all of them 
are in some way short of ideal beings. The ugliness of anti-civilization 
he sees chiefly in his drunken father. So he forms a naive division of 
people into good and bad, civilized and uncivilized, before he begins his 
quest down the river. But on that journey he encounters two shocking 
demonstrations of how uncivilized civilized people can be. I refer, of 
course, to his experiences while he is a guest, almost an adopted son, of 
the Grangerfords, and to the murder committed by Colonel Sherburn. 
In both narratives there is vivid exemplification of what Freud posits 
as that aggressiveness which expresses the death instinct against Eros, 
the life instinct and maker of civilization. And in both narratives the 
principal aggressors are ostensibly civilized people. Mark Twain is 
careful to detail the excellence of his whole prosperous, socially elevated 
Grangerford family in a portrait of the patriarchal Colonel: 
Col. Grangerford was a gentleman, you see. He was a gentle 
man all over; and so was his family. He was well born, as the 
saying is, and that's worth as much in a man as it is in a horse, 
so the Widow Douglas said, and nobody ever denied that she 
was of the first aristocracy in our town; and pap he always 
said it, too, though he warn't no more quality than a mudcat 
himself. ... He was as kind as he could be?you could feel 
that, you know, and so you had confidence. Sometimes he 
smiled, and it was good to see; but when he straightened 
himself up like a liberty-pole, and the lightning begun to 
7Androcles and the Lion (London: Constable, 1921), p. 3. 
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flicker out from under his eyebrows, you wanted to climb a 
tree first, and find out what the matter was afterwards. He 
didn't ever have to tell anybody to mind their manners? 
everybody was always good-mannered where he was. Every 
body loved to have him around, too; he was sunshine most 
always?I mean he made it seem like good weather. When 
he turned into a cloud-bank it was awful dark for half a 
minute, and that was enough; there wouldn't nothing go 
wrong again for a week.8 
An admirer of civilization, Huck finds the entire world of the Granger 
fords, as he first sees it, congenial beyond belief. But he has not yet heard 
of the feud. When he does, his education is rapidly advanced, first by 
a conversation with Buck, who outlines the rationale of a feud, and then 
by the skirmish which ends with Buck shot down. Huck has learned 
one lesson as to how civilization can tolerate a barbarism which a simple 
barbarian could not match. 
Very soon he learns another, when Colonel Sherburn kills the 
drunken Boggs and then faces down a lynching mob. This incident is 
more briefly told than that of the feud. Since the two seem to make the 
same point, one wonders why Mark Twain included the second at all. 
One may guess that the two incidents illustrate two ways in which 
justice and order, two benefits of civilization, may be perverted by 
civilized people. The feud, a private guerilla war, has its own justice and 
order, understood by all participants. An apologist might say that the 
feud harms only Grangerfords and Shepherdsons, all of whom, except 
for Harney and Miss Sophia (the Romeo and Juliet of this piece), accept 
its conditions. An adverse critic might say that the harm spreads far 
wider, for the killings rob a needful society of potential leaders. But any 
resolution of these conflicting views is left to the reader's inference. 
To draw conclusions about perverted justice from Colonel Sherburn's 
savage act and its consequences is still an operation of inference. But 
these may be clearly drawn. Here a man is murdered for no worse action 
than offensive conduct. Boggs is no part of the feud, and one can 
regrettably guess at the deranged notion of personal honor Colonel 
Sherburn is vindicating. But what force of law and order exerts itself 
to punish this murderer? Only a spineless mob, which can be rendered 
impotent by the contempt and bravado of one criminal. We never hear 
*The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn (New York: Norton, 1961), pp. 86-87. 
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of any effort to arrest, indict, try and punish the patently guilty Colonel 
Sherburn. Socially privileged and officially civilized, he goes free, 
thereby frustrating what Freud notes as "the first requisite of civiliza 
tion . . . the assurance that law once made will not be broken in favor 
of an individual." Colonel Sherburn shows us, as do others in the book, 
what Freud asserted in The Future of an Illusion, that "every individual 
is 
virtually an enemy of civilization, though civilization is supposed to 
be an 
object of universal human interest." 
Between these two incidents Huck Finn is introduced to the first of 
two other exposures to abuses of civilization fostered by its very values. 
First he and Jim must endure for what seems an intolerable time the 
antics of the Duke and the Dauphin before their final ignominious 
reward. Soon thereafter begins the long and often censured account of 
"rescuing" Jim, as stage-managed by Tom Sawyer. 
Before examining these sequences, however, let me state another 
widely accepted assumption. Civilization and high, often snobbish, 
culture, not only go together but also by reciprocal action elevate each 
other. So Huck Finn admires the achievements of cultured people, and 
again he regards his uncultured state as the necessary concomitant of his 
unworthiness. He never understands, even at the end of the story, that 
in his way he is as accomplished culturally as the best of those whom 
he encounters. Huck Finn is impressed by the amenities, as well as by 
the abundant good food, of the Grangerford household. He can no more 
understand than can the Grangerfords that their cultural values and 
accomplishments, including Emmeline's poetry, would be a joke or a 
cause of sorrow to any one possessed of conventional sophistication. In 
the Duke and the Dauphin, however, and later in the antics Tom Sawyer 
directs as they "rescue "Jim, Huck Finn sees perversions of the already 
mentioned alliance of civilization and cultural performances. Again, as 
with the two sequences of killing, we have a complementary pair of 
exposures, with Huck Finn undeceived through both, though he does 
not exert himself to end the follies. 
The cultural values misused by the Duke and the Dauphin and then 
by Tom Sawyer derive from the conventions of romance, as these were 
imported from Western Europe into the raw and yet dependent United 
States, an importation for which Mark Twain made Walter Scott bear 
a burden of blame. Ignorant as they are, the Duke and the Dauphin 
know just enough of these conventions to understand that the yokels find 
them impressive and cannot at first detect the frauds perpetrated in their 
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name. This sequence, then, shows the exploitation possible through 
cultural fakery, for in the prosperous period before they end their 
ascendancy tarred and feathered on a rail, the Duke and the Dauphin 
live in a fraud's paradise. 
No moral opprobrium and no vengeance by outraged victims attend 
the rescue of Jim, supervised by Tom Sawyer, according to what he 
understands of the romantic escapes which he associates with Baron 
Trenck, Casanova, Benvenuto Cellini, and Henry IV, three of whom did 
describe escapes in their autobiographies. Tom Sawyer, it is clear, has 
done a powerful amount of reading, and from his insatiable credulity 
has fixed on principles as delusionary as those which possessed the 
uneducated Catherine Morland in Jane Austen's Nonhanger Abbey. But 
the worst that Tom Sawyer can be accused of is folly and self-indul 
gence. From the beginning both Huck Finn and Jim appraise the 
situation realistically, and though they protest the excesses, they do not 
actively rebel. The reader may be disappointed that they only protest, 
never resist, Tom's foolishness. The fact is that, except when they deal 
with themselves and each other, neither one is a forceful moral agent, 
a 
strange failing when one considers that as moral perceptors they are 
both quick and accurate. Huck Finn speaks for both as he assures the 
reader that he properly dealt with the Duke and the Dauphin as with 
frauds: "If I never learnt nothing else out of pap, I learnt that the best 
way to get along with his kind of people is to let them have their own 
way" (p. 102). Scarcely the policy one might expect from a member 
of a community of saints. Should we simply reproach Huck and Jim for 
constitutional moral laxity and a strategy founded on expedient cyni 
cism? I think not. What we really have here is another crippling effect 
of civilization. So habituated is Huck Finn (and presumably Jim too) 
to believing that because he lacks the authority which being civilized 
bestows, he has a right only to perceive privately, but not to act upon 
others. Huck Finn cannot understand that, being highly civilized, he 
more than deserves an authority which he never thinks of asserting. The 
result of all this is an impairment, not of his moral sense, but of his 
moral energy. Repeatedly he shows himself capable of feelings consist 
ent with charity. He sees the Duke and the Dauphin getting at last that 
rough justice which their offenses deserve: "Well, it made me sick to 
see it; and I was sorry for them poor pitiful rascals, it seemed like I 
couldn't ever feel any hardness against them any more in the world. It 
was a dreadful thing to see. Human beings can be awful cruel to one 
44 
another" (p. 180). It is hard to imagine a higher degree of civility, 
without any hint of self-righteousness, than these sentiments reveal. 
Ignorant of moral theology, Huck Finn knows that part of the doctrine 
of charity requires that, though one should abhor the sin and understand 
that punishment is deserved, one sins himself if he abhors the sinner. 
Are we to 
reproach Huck Finn and Jim because they rarely convert their 
attitudes into actions bearing on other people? No. Such is the power 
over them of the alleged superiority which Tom and others gain from 
being cultured and civilized that they dare not assert their good sense 
against conduct which is ridiculous or inhumane, or both. What Huck 
Finn and Jim perceive, as well as any reader who is not so besotted as 
Tom Sawyer, is exactly what the members of the Scriblerus Club in the 
eighteenth century noted about the dunces, that from the sources they 
imitated they could adopt only the tricks and devices, while failing to 
understand the principle which gives these devices unity and meaning. 
The result of such an assembling of fragments is a folly in itself and a 
violation of culture's essential unifying power. 
I would be mistaken, of course, were I to treat the sequences involving 
the capers of the Duke and the Dauphin and the rescue of Jim as if they 
were narratives as realistic as the story of the Grangerford-Shepherdson 
feud. It is impossible to believe that Mark Twain intended or supposed 
that his readers would perceive any such uniformity of verisimilitude. 
If there is the discordancy of narrative intentions which some readers 
have found in the final chapters o? Huckleberry Finn, it is introduced, not 
with the campaign to rescue Jim, but with the intrusion of burlesque 
and gross comedy in Chapter 19, less than halfway through the book, 
when the Duke and the Dauphin first come aboard the raft. From that 
point on believable and fantastic narration are mixed together, with no 
overt 
attempt on Mark Twain's part to provide transitions or to resolve 
them into a single system of credibility. And the reader needs no such 
help. For he is in approximately the same situation as that presented by 
Don Quixote, in which repeatedly the credible and the incredible fuse 
in narrative sequences. A reader must be a purist to find this objection 
able, for what Cervantes sought was not a system of verisimilitude such 
as Defoe and Dreiser repeatedly achieve, but rather a system of true 
knightly morality, embodied in the mad nobility of Don Quixote, 
whom Freud also cites in Jokes and the Unconscious as a figure of fun at 
first who becomes an embodiment of the highest morality. We cannot 
grant Tom Sawyer the dignity which we give to Don Quixote, for 
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Tom's devotion to the values of romance is self-indulgent. But the 
means of revealing the two, through narrative which mingles the 
realistic and the fanciful, are essentially the same. 
Thus Mark Twain conducts Huck Finn and the reader through a 
series of demonstrations of the satisfactions and discontents, the uses and 
abuses, of civilization. He emphasizes the discontents and abuses, as befits 
an author in the moralistic tradition of comedy, more concerned with 
exposure than with congratulation. There is nothing perceptibly comic 
about Freud's essay, but he too is concerned with the exposure and also 
with causation, the latter of which does not engage Mark Twain's 
interest, for he is content for explanation with the "damned human 
race." It is an index of Mark Twain's urbanity, however, that he can 
make the damned human race seem at times amusing, at times depraved, 
at times both. 
As I noted earlier, Freud restricted his consideration of the causative 
factors in the forming of civilization and the personal discontents 
inevitably generated to what can be explained by psychoanalytic theory. 
Thus he omitted discussion of specific social manifestations and any 
intimation of value judgments. Let no one think I am reproaching Freud 
for failing to complete his task. This would be to reproach him for 
omitting what he never intended to do, for, as a theoretical scientist, he 
felt obligated to stay within the confines of demonstrable theory and 
confirmatory evidence. But Mark Twain was writing a story and could 
scarcely have avoided, even if he had wished to, specific social manifesta 
tions. It seems likely also that, despite a direct?and too ostentatious? 
disavowal, he is also providing the reader the narrative material from 
which to infer moral judgments. Moreover, though Mark Twain does 
not give us a systematic history of Huck Finn's attitudes toward 
civilization, we do see in the young man a progression remarkably like 
what Freud describes, the emergence of ambiguous feelings toward the 
cultural institutions he must face, and, even more, the dominance over 
him of a maturing conscience, which makes him feel guilty. Guilty of 
what? As with most of us, nothing except being our own ordinary, 
aggressive, retrograde selves. And this sense of guilt is what keeps us 
civilized, as Freud eloquently shows. The only thing Mark Twain omits 
is what we expect him to omit?any sign of sexuality in any character. 
To be sure, throughout Mark Twain's narrative and the moral judg 
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ments which it supports there is no hint of a theoretical concern with 
civilization. But evidently he is deeply concerned with civilization as 
it bears on persons and societies in daily action, and wishes his readers 
to share his concern. 
By this time I should think that my conclusion is obvious. Different 
and alike as the two men were, their books are complementary. It is as 
if they had agreed that what understanding one omitted the other would 
provide. Among the many sad accidents of cultural history is that the 
two of them never met. I believe that they would have found each other 
congenial, compatible in their dispositions, their insights, their sense of 
comedy, and their tempered sorrow that the human condition in a state 
of civilization is not, and probably never can be, happier than it is. 
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